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Abstract: This commentary takes a closer look at how “constructive mod-
els of subjective perception,” referred to by Collerton et al. (sect. 2), might
contribute to the Perception and Attention Deficit (PAD) model. It fo-
cuses on the neuronal mechanisms that could mediate hallucinations, or
false inference – in particular, the role of cholinergic systems in encoding
uncertainty in the context of hierarchical Bayesian models of perceptual
inference (Friston 2002b; Yu & Dayan 2002).
Collerton et al. provide a compelling synthesis implicating cholin-
ergic dysfunction in the aetiology of recurrent complex visual hal-
lucinations (RCVH). Furthermore, they observe “that both sen-
sory release and top-down activation are necessary, but neither in
itself is sufficient to cause high rates of RCVH” (sect. 6.3, para. 3).
This fits very comfortably with models of perceptual inference
based on hierarchical Bayes, in which cholinergic mechanisms
may balance bottom-up sensory evidence and top-down priors by
encoding their relative uncertainty or precision. In short, cholin-
ergic dysfunction may result in a failure to properly integrate sen-
sory information and prior expectations. In what follows, I try to
explain how this might happen.
Perceptual inference is the same as statistical inference and
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tion (i.e., the conditional probability). In classical inference, using,
say, t-tests, inference is based on two things: (1) an estimate of the
effect and (2) the standard error or uncertainty about that esti-
mate. The t-statistic is simply the ratio of these two quantities. The
basic idea here is that hallucinations can be regarded as false in-
ference that arises not because of impaired estimation (i.e., sen-
sation) but a failure to encode the uncertainty. In the t-test exam-
ple, this might mean the standard error was always too small,
leading to false inference based on pathologically large t-values.
How might this happen in the brain?
Current thinking in computational neuroscience and machine
learning points to hierarchical Bayes as the best candidate for un-
derstanding perception. I have introduced the notion of empirical
Bayes in this context: empirical Bayes using the conditional inde-
pendence  among  hierarchical  levels  to  form  empirical  priors
based on the sensory data. This means (almost paradoxically) that
cortical hierarchies can construct their own priors, where each
level of the hierarchy is subject to constraints or priors from the
level above (top-down effects) when accounting for sensory evi-
dence from below (bottom-up effects). There are many issues that
attend this theoretical perspective (see Friston 2002b for review).
Here I focus on the putative role of cholinergic neurotransmission
in the genesis of hallucinations.
Mathematically, neuronal dynamics and synaptic efficacy are
considered to minimise something called the free energy(F, a con-
cept from statistical physics). The quantities that minimise the
free energy are the conditional density q(n) of the causes n of sen-
sory input (e.g., a high-level representation of a face) and some
hyperparameters l encoding the uncertainty or noise. These two
quantities correspond loosely to the numerator and denominator
of the t-statistic above and are updated in two iterated steps: the
E-step and the M-step. This is known as expectation maximisation
in statistics.
E q(n)   m
q in F
M l   m
l in F
For a hierarchical model, the E- and M-steps for the i-th level can
be implemented with the following descent scheme, for any gen-
erative or constructive causal model ni   gi(ni+1) under Gaussian
assumptions:
This can be implemented in a simple neuronal architecture of the
sort shown in Figure 1. Here the conditional density is repre-
sented in terms of its average or expectation n ˆi and covariance  i,
i.e., q(ni)   N(n ˆi,  i) where
which  is  an  implicit  function  of  the  hyperparameters.  In  this
scheme, the quantities n ˆiand prediction error  icorrespond to the
activity of two neuronal subpopulations, whereas the hyperparam-
eters li are encoded by the synaptic efficacy of lateral connec-
tions.1Note that this scheme converges when n ˆicannot further re-
duce prediction error and   i/ ni
T  i   0. In Friston (2002b) I
discuss the potential role of cholinergic neurotransmission in me-
diating the M-step. A related theme, using a different perspective,
is discussed in Yu and Dayan (2002). What would happen if the
hyperparameters were encoded improperly with cholinergic dys-
function?
A failure to optimise the hyperparameters will produce an in-
appropriate balance between sensory and prior influences on the
conditional  expectation  of  what  caused  any  sensation.  This  is
shown schematically in Figure 2. Here, we assume the deficit pro-
duces hyperparameters that fail to encode uncertainty in the pri-
ors. This means too much weight is afforded to the prior expecta-
tion from supraordinate cortical levels, and false inference ensues.
Collerton et al. discuss a similar notion from the point of view of
a “failure to select the correct proto-object in the PAD model”
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Figure 1 (Friston). The top panel is a schematic showing two
neuronal subpopulations representing the conditional expectation
of sensory causes for a single cortical level and the influences they
are subject to. The bottom panel shows the implicit probability
densities encoded by these neuronal activities and synaptic effica-
cies after convergence. Note that the uncertainty or width of these
densities is determined by the hyperparameters. The conditional
density, upon which inference is based, is drawn in a solid line.
Figure 2 (Friston). A schematic showing one way in which hal-
lucinations could occur. In this example, the hyperparameter en-
coding prior uncertainty has been made too small li r l ˜
i, result-
ing in overconfidence in the priors and a false or hallucinatory
conditional expectation.(sect. 7.4.2, para. 2) when cholinergic inhibition leads to incorrect
“pattern matching.”
The mechanistic understanding afforded by this computational
approach can usefully account for many observations made by
Collerton et al. For example, “Either impaired attention [i.e., prior
expectations] or impaired sensory activation [i.e., evidence] alone
will rarely produce hallucinations” (sect. 7.3, para. 1). It is their re-
lationship that defines a hallucination. In this sense, the integra-
tion, through the conditional density, is the key mechanism in per-
ception  and  this  integration  may  depend  on  the  integrity  of
cholinergic mechanisms. The false learning associated with more
enduring changes mediated by the M-step may improperly pair
sensory contexts with high-level representations leading to “the
same image being triggered again and may account for the repeti-
tion of specific images” (sect. 7.5.1, last para.). In empirical Bayes
the priors are driven by prediction errors from the level below (see
Fig. 1). In the absence of sensory input, priors are not induced.
This may account for what the target article describes as “an oth-
erwise puzzling feature of hallucinations – that they disappear on
eye closure or on complete visual loss” (sect. 7.5.2, para. 2).
In terms of clinical neuroscience, there are remarkable overlaps
between the PAD model for hallucinations and the disconnection
hypothesis for schizophrenia, a disorder associated with halluci-
nations. In terms of functional anatomy, Collerton et al. note that
“Object-based attention depends primarily on the function of lat-
eral frontal cortex, and object perception depends primarily on
the ventral visual stream” (sect. 7.3, point 3). They later cite evi-
dence from functional imaging of patients who are prone to hal-
lucinations. In fact, the disconnection hypothesis was based on
early observations of abnormal coupling between left dorsolateral
prefrontal cortex and posterior temporal regions, as measured
with positron emission tomography in schizophrenics (see Friston
1998 for review).
The disconnection hypothesis posits abnormal functional inte-
gration (at the synaptic level) as the primary pathophysiological
mechanism in schizophrenia. The premise is that synaptic plastic-
ity  is  regulated  abnormally  during  emotional  and  perceptual
learning. The abnormal regulation probably involves dopaminer-
gic dysfunction in emotional learning or operant conditioning (i.e.,
the formation of stimulus-response links) and cholinergic dys-
function in perceptual learning (i.e., the formation of stimulus-
stimulus associations). Exactly the same neurotransmitters are im-
plicated by Collerton et al. in RCVH: “pharmacological data so far
available indicate a primary role for cholinergic and secondary role
for dopaminergic dysfunction in the aetiology of RCVH” (sect.
3.2, last para.). However, they later note “that dopamine receptors
are not prevalent in visual processing areas (whereas muscarinic
cholinergic receptors are)” (sect. 7.4.2, para. 2). This is consistent
with the conclusion of a recent editorial on disconnection and cog-
nitive dysmetria in schizophrenia: “In short, normal interactions
between dopamine and the cellular or synaptic mechanisms re-
sponsible  for  plasticity  are  essential  for  emotional  learning,
whereas the interaction between cholinergic neurotransmission
and associative plasticity is important for perceptual learning”
(Friston 2005). Although Collerton et al. state, “Eye disease and
schizophrenia pose greater challenges to our model” (sect. 7.6.2.2,
para. 5), there are encouraging and important points of contact be-
tween  the  PAD  model  and  theoretical  treatments  of  cerebral
pathology in schizophrenia.
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NOTE
1. In this summary I have assumed that the parameters of the genera-
tive model of how sensory inputs are caused have already been learned (in
the M-step). These parameters are encoded by the synaptic efficacy of for-
ward and backward connections linking levels.
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